Chapter 15: Public Utilities by Baer, Herbert
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law
Volume 1961 Article 18
1-1-1961
Chapter 15: Public Utilities
Herbert Baer
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml
Part of the Administrative Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Baer, Herbert (1961) "Chapter 15: Public Utilities," Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law: Vol. 1961, Article 18.
CHAPTER 15 
Public Utilities 
HERBERT BAER 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§15.1. Railroads. The Supreme Judicial Court completed the 
litigation in Town of Wilmington v. Department of Public Utilities} 
which was before the Court during the 1960 SURVEY year on the proce-
dural question of the standing of the town to challenge a decision of 
the department.2 The merits of the case involved service changes pro-
posed by the Boston and Maine Railroad and authorized by the depart-
ment on its West Route Main Line between Boston, Reading, and 
Haverhill, and on its New Hampshire Main Line between Boston, 
Wilmington, and Lowell, the result of which was to eliminate pas-
senger service on a portion of the West Route Main Line. The 
department, after authorizing this change in service, ordered the rail-
road to construct a new station in Wilmington, at a location on the 
line still to be used, for the benefit of passengers fomerly using the 
North Wilmington station, which was on the portion of the line over 
which service was to be discontinued. 
The Court rejected the town's contention that the evidence of elimi-
nation of all passenger service and of virtually all of the freight service 
over this section of line was an abandonment within the meaning of 
Section 1(18) of the Interstate Commerce Act, which would require ap-
proval of the Interstate Commerce Commission. "Abandonment" 
means cessation of service coupled with intention not to resume serv-
ice and, as the evidence showed no curtailment of freight service to any 
customer nor any intention to deny freight service to any customer on 
this section of track, there was no abandonment. 
General Laws, c. 160, §129, requires a railroad to obtain the approval 
of a town to the relocation of a station within its boundaries. Such 
approval was not necessary in the present case, however, since the rail-
road did not ask to relocate the station but was ordered to institute 
a new stop by the department. 
The decision reaffirms the broad discretion lodged in the department 
HERBERT BAER is Counsel of the Department of Public Utilities and a member of 
the firm of Maloney, Williams & Baer, Boston. 
§15.1. 1341 Mass. 596,171 N.E.2d 282 (1961). 
2 Town of Wilmington v. Department of Public Utilities, 340 Mass. 432, 165 
N.E.2d 99 (1960). This opinion is discussed in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.l. 
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in the determination of the adequacy and necessity of railroad service, 
specifically holding that this power may include approval of the dis-
continuance of main line, as well as branch line, service. The depart-
ment may consider the financial condition of the carrier and the num-
ber of people serviced. The weight to be accorded to the conflicting 
interests and to the different financial indices is a matter for depart-
ment decision, the test being whether the conclusions reached by the 
department are supported by substantial evidence. 
§15.2. Bus companies. In Fortier v. Department of Public Utili-
ties,l the department had before it a petition to amend a certificate of 
a bus company which authorized service from Springfield to North-
ampton, by extending the service from Northampton through Hadley 
to Amherst. The city of Northampton refused to issue the local license 
required under G.L., c. 159A, §l, for the extension of the route within 
the city. Accordingly, the department was also requested to act as a 
licensing authority for Northampton under G.L., c. 159A, §3, which 
provides that if a person desiring to operate a route at least twenty 
miles in length holds a license from the terminal municipalities and in 
all but one of the intervening municipalities, the department may 
authorize service through the dissenting intervening municipality. 
The distance from Springfield to Amherst is about twenty-five miles, 
but from Northampton to Amherst only seven miles. Fortier, the com-
peting carrier, contended that the route sought was, in substance, a 
route from Northampton to Amherst, less than twenty miles, and that 
the department could therefore not grant the local license. 
The Supreme Judicial Court cut through the technical question of 
whether the department had amended an existing certificate or granted 
a new certificate. The obvious purpose of the statute is to eliminate 
the power of a single municipality to prevent intercity trips of fairly 
long distances. If the purpose of the petition had been to provide 
service between Northampton and Amherst, the department would 
have been powerless. But this authority was not sought and was, in 
fact, explicitly prohibited. The Court recognized that the substance 
of the grant was the permission to carry passengers between Springfield 
and Amherst, a trip of twenty-five miles. 
Some of the local licenses relied· on by the petitioner had been previ-
ously issued in connection with the grant of authority to operate be-
tween Springfield and Northampton. Fortier contended that these 
licenses were not valid for the Springfield-Amherst operation. This 
argument misconstrues the basis for the requirement of a local license, 
which is that the municipality should retain control over traffic within 
its boundaries. The town is not charged with the responsibility for im-
plementing transportation policy, which is the department's function. 
Accordingly, so long as the traffic within the municipality remains un-
changed, the municipality has no concern over revision of the certifi-
cate issued. The Court, therefore, concluded that all of the pre-
requisites for department action under Section 3 were present. 
§15.2. 11961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 991, 175 N.E.2d 495. 
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The evidence before the department had been taken by an employee 
designated under G.L., c. 25, §4. This statute requires that the em-
ployee "shall make a report in writing" to the commission, and the 
appellant contended that the failure of the employee in the present 
case to make a report rendered the decision of the department invalid. 
There is no explicit statutory requirement of a recommendation of the 
employee. It would seem that the verbatim transcript of the testimony 
which was transmitted to the commission constitutes a sufficient "re-
port." Moreover, Section 4 was enacted prior to the adoption of G.L., 
c. 30A, §11 (7), which permits parties to request a tentative decision of 
the employee and an opportunity to argue before the full commission. 
No such decision was requested by the parties in the present case. The 
opinion, nevertheless, seems to conclude that a report in addition to the 
transcript is required and, on the basis of Malden v. Metropolitan 
Transit Authority,2 that a report includes a recommendation. 
Since the entire record was before the commission and since no issue 
of fact depended upon the credibility of a witness, the Court concluded 
that the absence of a report was not prejudicial to the appellant. It 
may be that when the credibility of witnesses is an important issue, the 
Court would hold that the failure of the hearings officer to submit a 
report and recommendation would invalidate a commission decision. 
In Attorney General v. Department of Public Utilities,3 the depart-
ment's approval of an amendment to the operating agreement between 
Boston Terminal Corporation, the New York, New Haven and Hart-
ford Railroad Company, and the New York Central Railroad Company 
and of the proposed sale of South Station in Boston was attacked by the 
Attorney General and the city of Boston. Under the authority of G.L., 
c. 160, §131A, South Station in Boston is owned and operated by the 
Boston Terminal Company and is used by ~he two railroads under 
the operating agreement. The statute provides that any business cor-
poration: 
may apply to the Department for an order qualifying the corpora-
tion to acquire by purchase or otherwise, and to own and operate 
terminal facilities for ... [railroads]. The corporation shall 
agree that its operations, when qualified hereunder, shall be sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Department, and any operating 
agreements entered into in connection therewith shall be subject 
to the approval of the Department as to their reasonableness. 
In 1952 the terminal company had qualified under this section. 
The present petition before the department proposed a sale of the 
South Station building reserving in the terminal company for a 
period of years ownership of those portions of the premises used for 
railroad purposes, e.g., waiting room, ticket offices, and tracks, after 
which the terminal company would retain a leasehold interest in 
these facilities. The appellants contended that the department was 
2328 Mass. 491, 104 N .E.2d 428 (1952). 
31961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 921,175 N.E.2d 255. 
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powerless to approve this sale unless the prospective purchaser quali-
fied under the statute. Since the terminal company would continue 
to operate the terminal facilities after the proposed sale, it was held 
that the prospective purchaser would not be required to qualify under 
the statute which applies to corporations desiring both "to own and 
operate" terminal facilities. 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 
§15.3. Electric utilities: Service. General Laws, c. 164, §72, provides 
that the Department of Public Utilities may authorize the construction 
of a line for the transmission of electricity for distribution in a definite 
area, provided that the line is necessary for the purpose alleged, will 
serve the public convenience, and is consistent with the public interest. 
In Re Merrimack-Essex Electric CO.I the company sought authority to 
construct a line which would tie together three areas which were sup-
plied from different sources of power capacity. It alleged that the three 
areas were deficient in firm capacity, that is, the capacity available to 
serve each area was not sufficient to satisfy the maximum demand of the 
area, if the largest unit serving the area were out of commission. The 
tie line, by permitting the shuttling of excess power from one area to 
the other, would provide additional firm capacity in each of the three 
areas. Extensive hearings over a period of approximately two years 
were held, during which the company was opposed by a number of resi-
dent groups in the area, as well as by the United States Air Force, which 
operates a radio astronomy station in the area of the proposed route 
for the transmission line. 
The principal contentions of the residents were that there were alter-
native ways of providing additional power to the three areas and that 
therefore the route was not "necessary." Moreover, they argued, the 
growth of demand in the area during the course of the hearings was 
such that at their conclusion the additional firm capacity that the pro-
posed line would provide would be sufficient for only a very short time. 
The planning of a system for the transmission of electric power re-
quires predictions of load growth for considerable periods in the future. 
On any given set of predictions, there are almost always alternative 
solutions for providing for increased load growth. In the develop-
ment of electric companies provisions have been made for transmitting 
power in many directions from many power sources, and even for trans-
mitting power between different companies. Accordingly, it is prudent 
in planning with respect to one area in the system to consider the effect 
of any proposal upon the present or future relationship of that area to 
the remaining portions of the system. In this context, the term "neces-
sary" cannot be taken to mean that the proposed transmission line is 
the sole method of accomplishing purposes alleged in the petition. It 
is sufficient if the proposal is reasonably calculated to accomplish the 
purposes and if the purposes themselves are permissible. 
§15.3. I D.P.U. 12544 Gune, 1961). 
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The department recognized that, in addition to the proposed tie line, 
other sources of firm capacity would be required in the very near future. 
The proposed line, however, would permit the firming of all three areas 
by introducing additional capacity in anyone of the areas; and, of the 
various plans offered for providing additional firm capacity, the need 
for which was recognized by the opposition as well as by the petitioner, 
the department found that the proposed line represented the most rea-
sonable under the circumstances. 
Another contention was that the line, if permitted, should be placed 
underground, on the basis that the overhead construction of this line 
would disfigure the countryside and was therefore not in the public 
interest. Following prior decisions, the department held that the 
aesthetic considerations did not justify the additional cost of placing 
a line underground, the burden of which would fall on all the rate 
payers. 
It was also argued that the construction of the line overhead on the 
route proposed was inconsistent with the public interest because it 
would interfere with the operation of a United States Air Force radio 
astronomy station. The department found it unnecessary to decide 
whether, even if substantial interference were to result, construction of 
the line would not be in the public interest. This issue would require 
the balancing of the added burden of cost to the company and indi-
rectly its customers against the extent of damage to the air force pro-
gram. The department found that the weight of the evidence was that 
no such interference would occur and accordingly approved the con-
struction of the line. It recognized that, owing to the unavailability 
at the present time of testing devices of sufficient sensitivity, it was not 
possible to determine positively whether interference in fact would 
occur. Approval was therefore given conditioned upon retention of 
jurisdiction in the department to investigate the circumstances after 
the construction of the line and to order the replacement of portions 
of it if the department later finds that interference is of such magnitude 
that the public interest requires such replacement. 
In Re A. M. Buckley,2 the petitioner, who owned real estate on 
which he proposed to construct a mobile home development, was before 
the department under Section 92 of Chapter 164 of the General Laws, 
requesting that the department order the Worcester County Electric 
Company to provide service to him on terms that were legal and rea-
sonable. The company had agreed to serve, in accordance with the 
policy statement contained in its filed tariff, which provided that a 
trailer park operator must construct, own, and maintain the necessary 
low-tension distribution system and that the necessary high-tension 
system in excess of two poles and three spans of wire would be owned 
by the company but paid for by the trailer park operator. 
The company policy is based on two factors: (I) Trailer parks as 
compared to conventional residential developments are less permanent. 
The existence of a fixed dwelling furnishes some assurance, not present 
2D.P.U.1!I425 (May, 1961). 
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in the case of the trailer park, that, if the occupant moves, a new custo-
mer for the company will eventually replace him. (2) Trailer parks 
consist of a tract under single ownership in which spaces are rented 
to individual trailer owners. By analogy to the treatment of apart-
ment houses, the owners of which are responsible for all wiring, it was 
contended that the trailer park owner should be responsible for the 
expense of all facilities within the site. 
Conflicting evidence was presented as to the relative permanence of 
trailer parks or the lack of it. To the extent that the trailer park has 
attributes similar to a residential development of the conventional type, 
the company's policy discriminated against trailer park operators as 
compared to residential developers, since the rates applicable to custo-
mers in both are the same, although the trailer park operator has the 
additional burden of capital cost of constructing the system. To the 
extent that the trailer park is a permanent installation, the company 
reaps the same benefits that it would from a residential development 
without comparable investment and maintenance costs. 
The department concluded that trailer parks constitute a new devel-
opment which could not be dealt with fairly under existing customer 
classifications. On the one hand, the company is entitled to protection 
against not only the lack of permanence but more importantly the re-
quirement of substantial expenditures prior to the completion and 
occupancy of the trailer park. On the other hand consideration must 
be given to the fact that trailer living is becoming an increasingly com-
mon form of life in this country and that trailer occupants are better 
than average customers of electric companies. Although limiting the 
precise formula to the facts of the case, the department ordered service 
on the conditions which in broad outline will doubtless furnish the 
basis for trailer park service within the Commonwealth. In substance, 
the plan adopted by the department requires the trailer park operator 
to bear the entire initial cost of the construction of the facilities but 
permits him to recoup this cost by directing the company to pay the 
owner a fixed percentage of total revenue in the park over a fixed 
period of years. 
§15.4. Commercial motor vehicles: Rates. It has long been the 
practice of the department in dealing with tariffs filed by motor carriers 
of property to suspend the application of any new filing if a protest by 
a shipper or competing carrier is received prior to the effective date 
of the rate. In Re Containerized Transport Co.,! a complaint was 
filed by a carrier with respect to a rate of a competing carrier which 
had been in effect for over sixty days. Although the basis for the com-
plaint appears to have been that it was too low to be compensatory, 
neither the complainant nor the respondent offered any evidence of 
actual costs of the service. This left as the only issue before the de-
partment whether the burden of proof of reasonableness was upon the 
complainant or the respondent. Distinguishing the situation where a 
protest is filed prior to the effective date of the tariff, the department 
§15.4. 1 D.P.U. 13175 (July, 1960). 
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held that the burden is on the complainant once the rate has become 
effective. The purpose of requiring a tariff to be filed at least thirty 
days before its effective date is to permit examination and protest. 
Once the rate has become effective without protest, business relation-
ships may have been established and expenditures incurred to provide 
service, and fairness requires that the burden should be on the party 
desiring to nullify these business undertakings. The decision explicitly 
leaves open the issue of the locus of the burden of proof in cases in 
which investigation of a rate already in effect is undertaken by the de-
partment on its own motion, as distinct from upon complaint. 
§15.5. Water utilities: Rates. In Dedham Water Co.,1 the company 
proposed new rates which differentiated between customers who, be-
cause of their location at higher elevation, required repumping of 
water, and all other customers. The rates contained a differential be-
tween these two classes of customers of seven cents per 100 cubic feet, 
which represented the added pumping cost. The proposed rates re-
duced the differential that had long existed in the rate structure of the 
company between customers residing in the town of Dedham and those 
residing in Westwood. The company originally served the town of 
Dedham only, and at the time that the company began serving custom-
ers in Westwood, the rates instituted for Westwood customers were 
higher than those for Dedham customers, reflecting the increased cost 
of new plant needed to serve the new customers. In prior rate cases, 
the continuance of the differential had been attacked by the town of 
Westwood.2 In the present case Dedham objected to the reduction of 
the differential. 
The department approved the new rates, restating the basis for its 
holdings in this area, leaving the relationship between rates to manage-
ment discretion, within broad limits, after determining the permissible 
amount of total revenue, and stated: 
It is typical of disputes over rate structures that when a Com-
pany accedes to criticism over an historically developed rate and 
performs a cost study, urged upon it by certain customers, a new 
group of customers then raises its voice in criticism over the results 
of that study. There are no absolute answers in the field of the 
construction of rates. The most that can be expected is that the 
structure is based on accurate data to which a rational theory is 
consistently applied. In the last analysis judgment must be exer-
cised to determine which of a number of such rational theories is 
chosen. The Company's proposal meets these general standards. 
We do not believe that a rate structure which differentiates be-
tween customers on the basis of the political subdivision in which 
they live, is a sound one. The contention of the town of Dedham 
that rates should reflect the actual costs of the facilities used to 
serve each group of customers is impossible of general application, 
§15.5. 1 D.P.U. 13271 (Jan. 1961). 
2 See, e.g., Dedham Water Co., D.P .U. 12372 Guly, 1960). 
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and moreover, carried to a logical extreme, each customer would 
be entitled to a different rate depending upon his location in rela-
tionship to the source of water and the date on which his property 
has become connected to the system. 
We therefore approve of the elimination of the basis of the exist-
ing rate differential. For the same reasons, however, the elimina-
tion of even the proposed differential would not be unsound, and 
we will, therefore, require that the Company, on or before June 1, 
1961 submit to us the results of a study to determine what would 
be the effect on the customers of the elimination of this differ-
ential, without producing additional gross revenue for the Com-
pany. 
In Cheshire Water Co.,s the company sought approval of an in-
crease in rates based on its estimate of operating expenses for a future 
year. The department disallowed the rates, refusing to base its de-
cision upon future expenses. The department did recognize that, 
because of the location of the company in a mountainous area, its 
operating expenses fluctuated depending upon weather conditions. 
Operating expenses in the last full year preceding the filing of the new 
rates were substantially lower than in some of the preceding years, 
which showed variations both upward and downward from the average. 
The department, accordingly, based its decision on the five-year average 
of operating expenses. 
§15.6. Railroad: Eminent domain. General Laws, c. 160, §83, 
provides that a railroad may apply to the department, which, after 
notice to the owner and a hearing, may prescribe limits within which 
land may be taken by eminent domain, for the proper construction 
and security of the railroad and the convenient operation thereof, or 
for one or more new tracks adjacent to other land occupied by it. 
In Re Boston and Albany Railroad (New York Central Railroad Les-
see),! the evidence disclosed that the railroad prior to 1955 had oper-
ated trains from Allston to East Boston over a drawbridge spanning 
Chelsea Creek. In 1955 the drawbridge collapsed, and it was estimated 
that reconstruction of the bridge would cost $2.5 million. Rather than 
reconstruct, the railroad abandoned the track over the Chelsea Creek 
drawbridge and obtained trackage rights over the East Boston branch 
of the Boston and Maine Railroad. In order to connect the tracks of 
the Boston and Maine with those of the petitioner in East Boston, the 
railroad obtained from the General Services Administration of the 
United States, the then owner, a revocable license to lay track and to 
operate trains over the land in question. Through a series of convey-
ances, the J. Be M. Corporation became the owner of the land through 
which the tracks were laid. The railroad sought to purchase the 
twenty-four-foot wide strip over which the tracks were laid and, upon 
3 D.P.U. 1!l249 (Sept. 1960). 
§15.6. 1 D.P.U. 1!l!l01 (Nov. 1960). 
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being refused, petitioned for permission to take by eminent domain. 
The corporation contended that the railroad did not "require" the 
land in question, because there was an alternative route available, and 
that the taking of this route would inflict serious damage on the land-
owner. 
The department held that the taking was necessary notwithstanding 
that there were available alternative routes. Clearly, the railroad may 
"require" a given parcel if the expense of using alternatives for the 
same purpose is unduly burdensome. The department found that 
the purposes for which the land was sought are within those permitted 
by statute and that the alternative would impose an unreasonable 
burden on the railroad. There was no evidence that the injury to 
the landowner could not be compensated by damages in an eminent 
domain proceeding. 
§15.7. Bus utilities: Service. In Re Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc.? the 
department had granted the petitioner a certificate to operate between 
Springfield and Northampton, via Chicopee, Holyoke, and Easthamp-
ton, subject to the condition that the petitioner pay to the Holyoke 
Street Railway Company a fixed amount for each passenger carried to 
or from Northampton. The purpose of the condition was to recom-
pense the Holyoke Street Railway for diversion of traffic which would 
result from the operation of the petitioner over this route in the terri-
tory then being served by Holyoke. The department reserved the right 
to "review, modify or cancel" the condition. 
At the time of the grant, service between Holyoke and Northampton 
was offered by virtue of a transfer operation between Holyoke Street 
Railway and Massachusetts Bus Lines. Subsequently, in 1958, the de-
partment granted also to Holyoke Street Railway the right to provide 
through service between Northampton and Holyoke under which oper-
ation the revenues would be divided between Holyoke Street Railway 
and Massachusetts Bus Lines. At the same time the petitioner was 
denied authority to provide service between Holyoke and Northamp-
ton. 
In D.P.U. 12620 the petitioner sought to have the department cancel 
the condition contained in its original certificate, arguing that the oper-
ation between Northampton and Springfield had always been con-
ducted at a loss and that the burden of payments to Holyoke Street 
Railway was not in the public interest. 
The department held that the evidence disclosed that the grant of 
authority to the petitioner between Northampton and Springfield did 
not result in a diversion of traffic from Holyoke Street Railway to the 
petitioner and that, therefore, the condition in the certificate did not 
accomplish the purpose for which it was intended. Rather, because of 
the losses incurred in the operation of this route, the petitioner's other 
customers were subsidizing service on this route, and it was no longer 
in the public interest to continue the requirement that the petitioner 
§15.7. 1 D.P.U. 12620 (Oct. 1960). 
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pay Holyoke Street Railway in accordance with the condition obtained 
in the certificate. 
C. LEGISLATION 
§15.8. Bus companies. Licenses to provide charter service issued by 
the Department of Public Utilities under the provisions of G.L., c. 
159A, §IIA, are not limited as to territory. An effective limitation is 
achieved by virtue of the department's minimum rate order,l which 
requires that the carriers charge on the basis of mileage, including 
mileage between the place of garaging and the point of pickup of pas-
sengers. Carriers thus cannot compete effectively for business sub-
stantially removed from their place of garaging. 
Until the 1961 amendment of G.L., c. 1 59A, §7A,2 when a license 
was to be transferred, notice was given only to competing carriers in 
the area of the transferor's place of business. Since the transferee 
might have a place of business in an entirely different part of the Com-
monwealth, transfers frequently took place without notice to the trans-
feree's potential competitors. Moreover, although the original grant 
of the license required a finding of public convenience or necessity, no 
such finding was required in the case of a transfer. Thus a transfer 
could result in an additional carrier's competing in an area already 
adequately served. -. 
As a result of the amendment, no transfer may take place unless the 
transferee can show public convenience and necessity in the city or 
town in which the transferee proposes to do business, and carriers 
doing business in this city or town are required by statute to receive 
notice of any proposed transfer. 
§15.8. 1 D.P.U. 9545, D.P.U. 6846 (Dec. 1951). 
2 Acts of 1961, c. 268. §2. 
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